Winning the Battle but Losing the War: Towards a More Consistent Approach to Prevailing Party Fee Shifting in the Contractural Context by Schleppenback, John R.
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 12 | Number 2 Article 3
Spring 2017
Winning the Battle but Losing the War: Towards a
More Consistent Approach to Prevailing Party Fee
Shifting in the Contractural Context
John R. Schleppenback
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Courts Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Rule of
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
paul.mclaughlin@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John R. Schleppenback, Winning the Battle but Losing the War: Towards a More Consistent Approach to Prevailing Party Fee Shifting in the
Contractural Context, 12 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. 185 (2017).
Available at: https://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol12/iss2/3
WINNING THE BATTLE BUT LOSING THE 
WAR: TOWARDS A MORE CONSISTENT 
APPROACH TO PREVAILING PARTY FEE 
SHIFTING IN THE CONTRACTUAL 
CONTEXT 
John R. Schleppenbach* 
INTRODUCTION 186 
I. BACKGROUND 188 
A. The English and American Rules on Fee Shifting 188 
B. Fee Shifting Under Federal & State Statutes 190 
C. Other Non-Contractual Bases for Fee Shifting 194 
D. Contractual Fee Shifting Generally 196 
II. ANALYSIS 198 
A. A Party's Victory Need Not Be Complete to Be the 
Prevailing Party 199 
B. It Is Possible for Both Parties or Neither Party to Be 
the Prevailing Party 200 
C. The "Net Judgment" Rule is Commonly Applied, But 
Often Only as a Starting Point, and Other Factors 
Have Also Found Favor 202 
D. Courts May Reduce the Amount of Fees Awarded to a 
Prevailing Party Based on Reasonableness or Lack of 
Success 208 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 210 
A. Careful Drafting 210 
B. Careful Construction 211 
C. Holistic, Equitable Analysis 213 
CONCLUSION 216 
* John R. Schleppenbach is counsel at Seyfarth Shaw LLP, as well as the coach for 
the Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot Team at Northwestern 
Pritzker School of Law. Mr. Schleppenbach has previously worked for the Illinois Attorney 
General's Office, arguing appellate matters before the Illinois Supreme Court, and as a 
partner in the litigation department at Jenner & Block LLP. Any opinions expressed in this 
article are solely Mr. Schleppenbach's and are not intended to reflect the views of Seyfarth 
Shaw LLP. Mr. Schleppenbach obtained his J.D. summa cum laude and Order of the Coif 
from the University of Illinois College of Law in 2003. 
185 
186 FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:2:185 
INTRODUCTION 
As a general matter, history has not been very kind to losers. In 
the turmoil of the Middle Ages, loss on the battlefield could also mean 
the looting of one's property, the sacking of one's home, and potentially 
even the assault of one's spouse.1 The nineteenth century was the era 
of "to the victors belong the spoils," meaning that an electoral win al­
lowed the prevailing political party a complete monopoly on political 
appointments and government contracts to the exclusion of the loyal 
opposition.2 Even today, professional athletes would sooner face ano­
nymity than defeat on the playing field, living by the maxim that 
"winning isn't everything; it's the only thing."3 And no less of an au­
thority than the Swedish pop sensations ABBA have told us that, in 
matters of love, "the winner takes it all."4 Winners get the best of eve­
rything in our culture, often at the expense of the losers. Just ask A1 
Gore. 
Given the traditional cultural hegemony of the winner over the 
loser, one might expect that the U.S. legal system would reward pre­
vailing parties and penalize their opponents to the fullest extent 
possible. But this is not generally the case. In the United States, the 
winning litigant may obtain damages (or prevent its opponent from 
obtaining them), but it will not under ordinary circumstances be 
entitled to have its attorneys' fees and litigation costs paid by its 
opponent.5 There are some exceptions to this rule, including where 
the lawsuit has been brought under a statute or contract that author­
izes the award of fees and costs.6 But in the majority of U.S. cases, 
1. See, e.g., Stella Cernak, Sexual Assault & Rape in the Military: The Invisible Vic­
tims of International Gender Crimes at the Front Lines, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 207, 221 
(2015); see also Omar Yousaf. "IHL" as "Islamic Humanitarian Law": A Comparative Analy­
sis of International Humanitarian Law & Islamic Military Jurisprudence Amidst Changing 
Historical Contexts, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 439, 451 (2012). 
2. MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR: POLITICAL PATRONAGE FROM 
CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 319 (1971). The origins of this saying have been attrib­
uted to nineteenth century New York governor William L. Marcy. 
3. VINCE LOMBARDI, JR., WHAT IT TAKES TO BE #1, at 226 (2003). 
4. ABBA, THE WINNER TAKES IT ALL (Polar Studios 1980). 
5. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme 
Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 297 (1990). 
6. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) ("We have 
recognized departures from the American Rule only in specific and explicit provisions for 
Jnn"IT6 , attorneys' fees under selected statutes") (internal quotations omitted); 
t.U. Rich Co., Inc. v. U. S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 129 (1974) (listing 
exceptions to American Rule's prohibition of fee shifting). 
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each party bears its own expenses of bringing or defending the 
suit.7 
Even where an exception to the general rule against shifting 
fees does apply, it has not always been easy for courts to determine 
whether fee shifting is warranted. Cases of statutory fee shifting are 
more common and a body of case law has developed in accordance with 
the general policy that fees are to be awarded liberally to encourage 
private citizens to act as attorneys general enforcing important civil 
rights.s But in the context of contractual fee shifting, published deci­
sions are not as frequent and tend to be very fact specific.9 And 
contractual cases can be far more complex than statutory cases, which 
are concentrated in certain subject areas where success or failure can 
be fairly clear cut.10 For example, in a contractual case, the party 
bringing suit may claim breaches of several different provisions of the 
contract and prevail on some but not others. The party suing might 
claim damages in the millions but be awarded only pennies. Or that 
party might win on its claims of breach of contract but lose on related 
tort counterclaims brought by its opponents. In each case, the question 
presented is the same and it is a challenging one: Where each party 
has both succeeded and failed to some degree, who is the prevailing 
party? 
This article attempts to shed light on that question by analyz­
ing the law and policy applicable to the shifting of attorneys' fees and 
costs in the United States. Section I examines the history of fee shift­
ing from the English common law through the present, providing 
background on the general rules that can be discerned in both the stat­
utory and contractual context. Section II then analyzes a number of 
cases that have dealt with fee shifting in complex contractual cases, 
distilling various principles the courts have applied in dealing with 
prevailing party fee shifting. Section III recommends that courts and 
parties adopt a more consistent approach to fee-shifting that considers 
7. See John H. Beisner & Robert S. Peck, Emerging Civil Justice Issues, 9 J.L. ECON. 
& POL'Y 325, 329 (2013); Aimee McFerren, Buckhannon Board & Home Care, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources: The Supreme Court's Latest Assault on 
Prevailing Plaintiffs Eliminates the Catalyst Theory of Fee Shifting, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 155, 
156 (2002). 
8. See David Shub, Private Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit: 
Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L. J. 706, 713-21 (1992). 
9. Kevin P. Allen, Contractual Fee-Shifting Clauses: How to Determine "Prevailing 
Party" Status, 74 PA. BAR. ASS'N Q. 178, 179-80 (2003). 
10. See Jonathan T. Molot, Fee Shifting & the Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 
1816 (2013); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1588 (1993) ("There are over 200 federal 
statutes and almost 2000 state statutes that provide for shifting of attorney's fees."). 
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all of the facts and circumstances of the litigation in an attempt to 
reach a more equitable apportionment of fees, and the article briefly 
concludes in Section IV. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The English and American Rules on Fee Shifting 
The modern English rule that the losing party in a lawsuit pays 
both parties' costs can be traced as far back as the Statute of Glouster 
in 1275.11 That statute provided that in all cases where damages were 
recoverable, a successful plaintiff could recover from the defendant 
"the Costs of his Writ purchased, together with the Damages 
abovesaid."12 Courts interpreted the term "costs" liberally so as to in­
clude all legal costs of a suit.13 A 1487 statute imposed similar fee 
shifting against parties who brought unsuccessful appeals.14 It was not 
until 1531, however, that fee shifting was extended to allow successful 
defendants at the trial level to recover their costs, and then only in 
certain specified actions including trespass, debt, covenant, and con­
tract.15 By 1607, successful defendants could finally recover fees in all 
of the types of suits in which plaintiffs had that right.16 Importantly, 
the award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party under these statutes 
was automatic in England until 1875, when the Supreme Court of Ju­
dicature Acts made it discretionary with the court.17 Following that 
change, a court could deny a prevailing party fee shifting if it found 
good cause to do so.18 
It should be noted that the English fee-shifting regime does not 
necessarily require the losing party to pay its opponent's legal fees and 
costs in their entirety. Rather, there is a complicated set of rules that 
governs what expenses are to be paid or not paid and in what amounts, 
and the ultimate recovery is determined by a taxing master, in the ab-
(1275)) SeS Arthur L' Goodhart> Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929) (citing 6 Edw. I c. 1 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 853. 
J,- r!di C0U!° M" Da™on Fee Shifting & After-the-Event Insurance: A Twist to a Thir-
nS mh7S' to S"'"e " Twenty Firs' 
17. Id.; Goodhart, supra note 11, at 854. 
18. Goodhart, supra note 11, at 854. 
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sence of agreement among the parties.19 The prevailing party must 
submit a bill of costs, which the losing party then responds to in a con­
cise document referred to as a points of dispute.20 The prevailing party 
may also file a reply, and the losing party may request a hearing for 
both sides to present argument about the bill of costs.21 Generally, the 
taxing master's focus will be on determining whether specific costs are 
proportionate, reasonably incurred, and reasonable in amount.22 Costs 
are considered proportionate if "they bear a reasonable relationship to 
the sums in issue in the proceedings, the value of any non-monetary 
relief in issue in the proceedings, the complexity of the litigation, any 
additional work generated by the conduct of the paying party and any 
wider factors involved in the proceedings, such as reputation or public 
importance."2 5 The master may also decide to shift (or decline to shift) 
fees based on a party's perceived misconduct during the litigation.24 
The types of costs that generally may be recovered in some amount 
include court fees, counsel and solicitor fees, and necessary expenses of 
witnesses.25 
In addition, there are some classes of cases where fee shifting 
does not apply in England. Small claims cases are generally referred 
to informal arbitration and fee shifting is not available.26 This allows 
unrepresented individuals to bring these claims without the fear that 
they could be saddled with an opponent's fees and costs.27 Similarly, 
claims brought before specialized tribunals like the industrial tribu­
nals that hear employment claims are not subject to fee shifting.28 And 
where legal aid represents one of the parties to a suit, that party may 
not normally be ordered to pay its opponent's fees in the event the suit 
is unsuccessful.29 
It appears that Colonial America followed some species of the 
English fee shifting practice.30 Colonial statutes at the turn of the 
19. See generally Goodhart, supra note 11, at 855-72; Vargo, supra note 10, at 1571; 
THOMAS W. PRIDMORE, GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF BILLS OF COSTS (1884). 
20. U.K. CPR 47.6 & 47.9. 
21. U.K. CPR 47.13 & 47.14. 
22. Detailed Assessment: A Quick Guide, PRACTICAL LAW (Feb. 26, 2017, 3:28 PM), 
http://uk.practicallaw.eom/5-204-8012# (citing U.K. CPR 44.3). 
23. Id. 
24. U.K. CPR 44.11. 
25. Goodhart, supra note 11, at 857-58. 
26. Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays & Conditional Fees - An English Solution?, 37 




30. Root, supra note 16, at 584. 
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eighteenth century regulated both the fees attorneys could charge cli­
ents and the fees that could be assessed as costs to a losing party.-'" 
Federal statutes allowed federal courts to follow state law in this re­
gard.32 Later, however, as American attorneys asserted the freedom to 
charge whatever the market would bear for their services and the pub­
lic began to view fee shifting as an unjust penalty, the United States 
began to abandon the English tradition.33 In 1796, the Supreme Court 
struck an award of attorneys' fees from a judgment and stated "(tjhe 
general practice of the United States [was] in opposition to it."34 A sim­
ilar decision in 1851 held that a jury could not include attorneys' fees 
as part of a damage award.35 Finally, Congress passed a bill in 1853 
that barred the shifting of any fees or costs except for a modest docket 
fee.36 Another provision allows the taxing of some other modest admin­
istrative c.osts, such as printing costs.37 Otherwise, absent some 
applicable exception, fee-shifting is not available to litigants in the 
United States courts. 
B. Fee Shifting Under Federal & State Statutes 
Despite the presumption against fee shifting in the United 
States, federal and state statutes have long provided for fee shifting in 
certain classes of cases.38 By 1975, more than fifty such federal stat­
utes were in effect; by 1995, the number was more than 150.39 The 
subject matter of these statutes varies widely, for instance, from civil 
31. Vargo, supra note 10, at 1572. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vir­
ginia, and North Carolina established fee schedules and cost recovery. Other colonies had 
fee schedules but no provisions for cost recovery, although some scholars have suggested 
that the power to recover may have been implied. Id. 
32. Id. at 1575. 
3?V . See Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in 
Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 357, 369 (2011) (noting that despite "legislative 
initiatives to institute the English Rule in the United States," the support for this shift has 
diminished ); Davison, supra note 15, at 1213-14. 
34. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796). 
35. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 372-73 (1851). 
(1978)) ^ °f 1<6b 26' 1853' Ch' 8°' 10 Stat' 161 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1923 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2008). 
• 38o, ?ani™L' UPrevailinS Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-Shift­
ing s Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 (1993). Lowery traces the practice 
as far back as the Enforcement Act of 1870 Id 
39. Id. 
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rights to environmental protection to pensions.40 What these statutes 
tend to have in common, however, is that they protect the public inter­
est in such a way that Congress has deemed it advisable to encourage 
private parties to sue to ensure their enforcement.41 The idea is that 
individuals can shape the law in important ways that serve the public 
at large but, absent fee shifting, may not be able to afford to do so.42 
These fee shifting statutes in essence deputize private individuals as 
"private attorney generals" who help implement the law in places the 
government might not otherwise reach.43 Indeed, at one point U.S. 
courts recognized a "private attorney general" doctrine, under which 
they read federal statutes that were silent on fee shifting as permitting 
it "when the interests of justice so required."44 The Supreme Court dis­
approved of the doctrine in 1975,45 however, forcing Congress to 
include express fee shifting provisions in all laws they wished to en­
courage private parties to bring suit to enforce.46 
Fee shifting statutes vary in the degree of success they require 
for a party to recover fees. Many allow fees to be awarded to a party 
that "prevails" or "substantially prevails."47 The Supreme Court has 
determined in this context that, a party "prevails" when "actual relief 
on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship be­
tween the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that 
directly benefits the plaintiff."48 Such relief does not have to result 
from a final judgment, but may be obtained through a consent decree 
40. See Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1990); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (effective Dec. 16, 2014). 
41. See Martha Pacold, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Stat­
utes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1011-12 (2001) (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 
557, 568 (1992)) (Blackmun, J. dissenting)). 
42. See Shub, supra note 8, at 708-11. 
43. Id. 
44. Lowery, supra note 38, at 1444. 
45. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975) ("We do 
not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the 'American Rule' with respect to the allow­
ance of attorneys' fees. It has been criticized in recent years, and courts have been urged to 
find exceptions to it. It is also apparent from our national experience that the encourage­
ment of private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desirable in a variety 
of circumstances. But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees has 
survived. It is deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to 
invade the legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested 
by respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals."). 
46. See Lowery, supra note 38, at 1444. 
47. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)-
54 U.S.C. § 307105 (effective Dec. 19, 2014); 29 U.S.C. § 1370(e) (1989). 
48. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). 
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or settlement.49 And it need not be substantial; obtaining even nominal 
damages can constitute "prevailing" since it constitutes a modification 
of the defendant's behavior benefitting the plaintiff, no matter how 
small.50 Other statutes eschew the "prevailing party" language in favor 
of a more narrow approach, requiring "exceptional" circumstances for 
the prevailing party to recover fees.51 The Supreme Court has said that 
"there is no precise rule or formula" for determining if a case is "excep­
tional" for fee-shifting purposes, but the strength of the parties' 
litigating positions and the reasonableness of the parties' conduct are 
appropriate considerations.52 Still other statutes allow fee shifting 
more broadly, whenever the court determines it is "appropriate."55 The 
Supreme Court has determined that this language allows fee awards to 
parties "achieving some success, even if not major success."54 As might 
be expected, courts have varied in how they have applied these differ­
ent statutory thresholds for fee recovery.55 Thus, what entitles a 
plaintiff to fees in one statutory case may not do so in another, based 
solely on the time and location of the suit. 
The amount of fees to be paid under a fee shifting statute is 
generally not the actual amount of fees incurred, but rather an amount 
calculated pursuant to the so-called lodestar method endorsed by the 
Supreme Court.56 With this method, which was developed by the Third 
Circuit in the 1970s, a court multiplies the amount of hours spent by 
the various attorneys involved in litigating a matter against a reasona­
ble hourly rate for the attorneys' work.57 The Third Circuit's 
formulation of this method also included other factors that increased or 
decreased the amount of fees to be paid, like the contingent nature of 
the case and the quality of the attorneys' performance,58 and the Fifth 
Circuit subsequently enumerated twelve additional factors it deemed 
49. Id. at 111; Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) ("The fact that [a party) pre­
fers") "g 9 settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to 
om5^' Farrar' 506 lLS- at 113: Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir 
Zvlo). 
51. See, e.g., Patent Infringement Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952). 
52. Octane fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 1756 (2014) 
1 II3q pS8%«fQ' AirrAct' 42 U S'C' § 7607<f) (1990); Toxic Substances Control Act! lo U.S.C. § 2619 (effective June 22, 2016); 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1975). 
54. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 687-88 (1983). 
324 Pi, f,7 &Td BeTr' Fre"mli^P"r'y Concepts in Court Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 
,324 I i.i LIT. & ADMIN. PKAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 41, 48 (1987) (collecting cases). 
5b. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
1973)' Br°S" V" Am' Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 
58. Id. at 168-69. 
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relevant to determining a reasonable fee.59 The Supreme Court, how­
ever, has stated that the additional factors identified by the Third and 
Fifth Circuits should be used to enhance an award only where there 
has been "exceptional success" and that the amount of hours spent and 
the reasonable hourly rate will often be the only relevant considera­
tions in determining the amount of an award.60 In particular, the court 
has disapproved of increasing the fee award based on the risk involved 
in taking a case.61 
The lodestar method of calculating attorneys' fees has not been 
immune from criticism or confusion.62 First, courts have struggled to 
define what a "reasonable hourly rate" is.63 Some courts have taken 
what is termed the prevailing market rate approach, assessing the ex­
perience, reputation, and skill of each attorney involved in a case and 
determining what comparable lawyers in the community charge.64 
Others have used a micro-market approach, which looks at what attor­
neys with similar experience, reputation, and skill in the community 
charge in cases similar to the one at issue.65 Still others have used an 
attorney's own historical billing rates as the basis for determining 
what is reasonable.66 Second, courts have disagreed about the extent to 
59. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The 
factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, (3) the skill required to perform the necessary legal services, (4) the extent to 
which the case prevented the attorney from taking other cases, (5) the customary fee, (6) 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or by cir­
cumstances, (8) the amount involved and results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, 
and ability of the attorney, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of 
the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. 
60. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). 
61. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992). The court reasoned that risk 
already plays into the number of hours an attorney spends on a case and what the reasona­
ble hourly rate is. Id. at 562. It also noted that considering risk would raise the incentive to 
bring meritless claims as well as meritorious ones and increase the complexity of setting fee 
awards. Id. at 563, 566. 
62. See Justin Lamb, The Lodestar Process of Determining Attorney's Fees: Guiding 
Light or Black Hole?, 27 J. LEGAL PROF. 203, 206 (2003); Seth Hanft, Questioning the "Pre­
sumptively Reasonable Fee" as a Substitute for the Lodestar Method, 76 U. CIN. L. RF.V. 
1371, 1386-90 (2008); Pacold, supra note 41, at 1021. 
63. Hanft, supra note 62, at 1378-79. 
64. See, e.g., Elley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Chuadhry 
v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2014); Bryant v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 
578 F.3d 443, 450 (6th Cir. 2009); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F 3d 
694, 708 (3d Cir. 2005). 
65. See, e.g., Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 556 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections, 997 F.2d 857, 869 (11th Cir. 1993); Ramos Colon v 
Sec'y of HHS, 850 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1988). 
66. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Shakopee Mdewa-
kanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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which the Fifth Circuit's additional reasonableness factors should be 
considered when calculating the fee award.67 Federal courts generally 
disregard these factors except in exceptional cases, while state courts 
continue to consider them much more freely.68 Third, some state 
courts have departed from the lodestar method and made fee calcula­
tion a matter of the trial court's discretion, so long as the method 
chosen is reasonable and fair.69 Indeed, in some types of cases, simply 
awarding a percentage of the overall damages recovered as the fee 
award is favored over the lodestar method.70 So again, the end result is 
that different courts may make different fee awards in very similar 
cases. Overall, however, the lodestar method remains the dominant 
basis for determining attorneys' fees for purposes of federal fee shifting 
statutes.71 , 
C. Other Non-Contractual Bases for Fee Shifting 
In addition to fee shifting authorized by contract or statute, 
U.S. law permits fee shifting where there has been bad faith, under the 
Common Fund Doctrine, under the Substantial Benefit Rule, or in con­
tempt proceedings.72 
The bad faith exception relies on the courts' inherent power to 
manage their own affairs and expeditiously resolve cases, and allows 
fee-shifting where a party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wan­
tonly, or for oppressive reasons."73 It applies to conduct both before and 
after a lawsuit has been filed.74 It does not, however, apply to the con­
duct that gave rise to the lawsuit in the first place.75 Examples of the 
type of bad faith conduct that can lead to fee-shifting under this excep-
67. Matthew D. Klaiber, A Uniform Fee-Setting System for Calculating Court-Awarded 
Attorneys Fees: Combining Ex Ante Rates with a Multifactor Lodestar Method & a Perform­
ance-Based Mathematical Model, 66 MU. L. REV. 228, 243-245 (2006) 
N w89H uzToZn Sarf®'„ US; at 567' with ™ S. D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 707 
N.W.2d 85, 98-99 (S.D. 2005), with Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741-42 (Cal. 2001) 
69. See Jandreau v. LaChance, 116 A.3d 1273, 1279 (Me. 2015); Shuette v. Beazer 
Homes Holdings Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 548-49 (Nev. 2005). 
70. Klaiber, supra note 67, at 246-48. 
Feel\ln%?ilT^h»ml ?*?' The EffeCt °f ° R^cted Settlement on Attorney's 
1997 2015V ST O ,FF ,Forneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 
1997 ( 2015), Steven S Gensler, Diversity Class Actions, Common Relief, & the Rule of Indi­
vidual Valuation, 82 OH. L. REV. 295, 346 n.247 (2003) 
72. Root, supra note 16, at 585-87; Vargo, supra note 10, at 1579-87 
73. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) 
15 a973f°adWay EXPreSS'Im' V' Piper' 447 U'®' 762' 766 (1980); Hal1 Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 
InJv. 1372 <Pad- ^ 2°°7> bridge. 
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tion include knowingly raising frivolous arguments, purposefully 
delaying the litigation, or hampering enforcement of a court order.76 
The Common Fund Doctrine allows a party to recover its fees 
from a common fund that its litigation has created or preserved for the 
benefit of others.7' The idea is to prevent free riding where third par­
ties benefit from litigation funded by a plaintiff.78 It is most often 
applied in class actions,7" but has been extended to other contexts like 
insurance cases80 and antitrust litigation.81 For a litigant to benefit 
from the doctrine, he must show that the people benefitted by the law­
suit are small in number and easily identifiable, that the benefits of 
the litigation are traceable with some accuracy, and that there is rea­
son for confidence that costs can be shifted to those benefitting with 
some exactitude.82 
The Substantial Benefit Rule is similar to the Common Fund 
Doctrine in that it forces absent beneficiaries of litigation to share its 
costs.88 Unlike in Common Fund Doctrine cases, however, there is no 
common fund and the benefit conferred may be non-pecuniary.84 Gen­
erally, the rule is applied in cases involving shareholder litigation or 
unions, where there is an easily-identifiable group of beneficiaries (i.e. 
other shareholders or union members) who have received a clear non-
pecuniary benefit (i.e. unwinding of a merger or cessation of oppressive 
labor practices).85 
76. Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998); Primus Automotive Fin. 
Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997). 
77. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 133 (2013). The court noted that it 
has "recognized consistently that someone who recovers a common fund for the benefit of 
persons other than himself is due a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as whole" and 
that this rule "reflectisl the traditional practice in courts of equity." Id. at 133. It further 
observed that it has "applied [the rule] in a wide range of circumstances as part of [its] 
inherent authority." Id. 
78. Id. at 133. 
79. Victor v. Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P., 623 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir 
2010). 
80. Travelers Property Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh Pa 
735 F.3d 993, 1002 (8th Cir. 2013). 
81. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 454, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1974). 
82. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2004). 
83. F.D. Rich & Co., Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974) ("We have long 
recognized that attorneys' fees may be awarded ... where a successful litigant has conferred 
a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the court's shifting of fees operates to spread 
the cost proportionately among the members of the benefited class."). 
84. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394-95 (1970); Lewis v. Anderson 692 
F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982). 
85. Johnson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 939 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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The Supreme Court has also recognized that attorneys' fees 
may be shifted, notwithstanding the American Rule, in civil contempt 
actions occasioned by willful disobedience of a court order.*'1 As in cases 
of bad faith, the rationale is punitive, seeking to avenge "the court 
whose dignity has been offended and whose process has been ob­
structed."87 Courts generally limit the fee award to the actual amount 
incurred in pursuing the contempt, without regard to the fees that 
might have been incurred in other aspects of the proceeding.88 
D. Contractual Fee Shifting Generally 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that par­
ties may contract out of the American Rule on fee shifting.89 This 
exception to the American Rule can be traced back to the nineteenth 
century and the dominance of the lasseiz-faire doctrine.90 Unlike stat­
utory fee shifting, which is generally motivated by a desire to 
encourage private parties to bring lawsuits in the public interest, con­
tractual fee shifting may be motivated by a desire to avoid litigation 
and encourage contractual compliance.91 Most fee shifting agreements 
are entered into well in advance of any litigation, but they can also 
validly be entered into after litigation has begun, for instance as part of 
a settlement framework.92 Fee shifting agreements (like other con­
tracts) will not be enforced in cases where they are found to violate 
public policy or be unconscionable, however, such as by being one-sided 
or resulting from unequal borrowing power.93 
86. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (u|I|n 
a civil contempt action occasioned by willful disobedience of a court order an award of attor­
neys fees may be authorized as part of the fine to be levied on the defendant."). 
87. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923). 
r 8to?!ThTn^ 38,6 U S' at 718; Fe,dman v- Am- Palestine Line, Inc., 18 F.2d 749 (2d 
1927); Board of Trade of City of Chi. v. Tucker, 221 F. 305 (2d Cir 1915) 
nn,8l'Veirhmann' ™ U'S' f 717 ("The rule here has lonS been th^ attorneys fees are 
"herefor. X 7 reC°Verable m the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing 
90. Vargo, supra note 10, at 1578. 
(10tt Cifl'onfi'm S' F°ods?™ce' Inc- v- Shamrock Foods Co., 246 F. App'x 570, 577 n.8 
20d7) ( In ^eral, the purpose of contractual fee-shifting provisions is to en-
rPgLT5P4lia256 7n C°ZTTd fliSCOUra&e ^founded lawsuits."); Dimick v. Dimick. 
(Colo 1993X ! V" Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936. 940 
92. Vargo, supra note 10, at 1579. 
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Fee shifting provisions can be and have been incorporated in 
virtually every kind of contract imaginable, including real estate con­
tracts,•,1 employment contracts,95 construction contracts,96 contracts 
for the sale of goods,9' and insurance contracts.98 These provisions 
often mirror the language of fee shifting statutes by awarding fees to 
the "prevailing party."99 
It should also be noted that there are some federal and state 
laws that impact the application of contractual fee shifting clauses. 
For example, the federal Trust Indenture Act of 1939 provides 
that, unless they specifically provide otherwise, all public bond 
indentures shall be deemed to include a provision giving courts 
the discretion to award fees to either party in litigation relating to 
the indenture, based on the merits of its position.100 Similarly, some 
states including California have statutes that transform one­
way fee shifting clauses into two-way fee shifting clauses.101 New 
Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. & Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 343 P.3d 1044, 
1048 (Colo. App. 2015); Garrett Inv., LLC v. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 
1338 (S.D. Ala. 2013). 
94. Ochse v. Henry, 88 A.3d 773, 780 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014); In re Estate of Gattis, 
318 P.3d 549, 558 (Colo. App. 2013). 
95. Oster v. Baack, 351 P.3d 546, 551 (Colo. App. 2015); Sternberg v. Nanticoke Mem'l 
Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Del. 2013); Weichert Co. of Md., Inc. v. Faust, 989 A.2d 
1227, 1234-35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
96. Extreme Constr. Co. v. RCG Glenwood, LLC, 310 P.3d 246, 255 (Colo. App. 2012); 
King v. Brock, 646 S.E.2d 206, 206 (Ga. 2007); Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946 
949 (Wyo. 2000). 
97. Allied Indus. Scrap, Inc. v. OmniSource Corp., 776 F.3d 452, 453 (6th Cir. 2015); 
ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 133 (Alaska 
2014); Com-Corp. Indus., Inc. v. H&H Mach. Tool Co. of Iowa, No. 69318, 1996 WL 631100 
at *11 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2015). 
98. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Britt Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc., 401 F. App'x 341, 345 
(10th Cir. 2010); Leslie Salt Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins., 637 F.2d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1981). 
99. See, e.g., Dolphin LLC v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 715 F.3d 1243, 1246 n.4 (11th Cir. 
2013); Southern Wine & Spirits of Nev. v. Mountain Valley Spring Co., LLC, 712 F.3d 397, 
399 (8th Cir. 2013); Salewski v. Pilchuck Veterinary Hosp., Inc., P.S., No. 72314-6-1, 2015 
WL 5098717, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015); Montara Owners Ass'n v. La Noue Dev., 
LLC, 353 P.3d 563, 567 n.14 (Or. 2015); Bennett Blum, M.D., Inc. v. Cowan, 330 P.3d 961, 
963-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). Other clauses refer to the "substantially prevailing party" or 
the "successful party." MacPherson v. Magee Mem'l Hosp. for Convalesence, No. 80 EDA 
2013, 2015 WL 7571937, at *6 (Pen. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2015); SAK & Assocs., Inc. v. Fergu­
son Constr., Inc., 357 P.3d 671, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2016). 
101. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.096 (West 
2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.330 (West 2016). The language of the Washington provision 
is representative of all three: "In any action on a contract or lease entered into after Septem­
ber 21, 1977, where such contract or lease specifically provides that attorneys' fees and 
costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of such contract or lease, shall be 
awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether he or she is the party specified 
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York also has such a statute, but it is limited to landlord-tenant mat­
ters.102 
II. ANALYSIS 
As this background suggests, courts in the United States have a 
long history of awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in liti­
gation where some exception to the American Rule allows it.103 But 
cases defining what it means to be a "prevailing party," especially in 
the contractual context, are not exceedingly numerous or entirely con­
sistent with one another.104 The relative shallowness of case law in 
this area may be in part because many lawsuits do not allow for a rea­
sonable dispute as to which party prevailed.105 If one party wins all of 
the claims in the case along with a money judgment, the prevailing 
party is clear and no discussion of that phrase's meaning is required.106 
The seeming contradictions in the case law, meanwhile, may well re­
sult from the wide variety of jurisdictions and the many competing 
policy interests involved, as well as the relative scarcity of these is­
sues.107 Regardless, courts do occasionally find themselves with a 
genuine controversy as to the prevailing party, such as when a plaintiff 
has brought multiple claims but only won some of them,108 when a de­
fendant has raised counterclaims and both parties have won and lost 
claims,109 or when a party has prevailed on legal issues but not ob­
tained damages or, in some cases, even an affirmative judgment.110 In 
in the contract or lease or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to 
costs and necessary disbursements." WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.84.330. 
102. N.Y. REAL PROF. Law § 234 (2016). 
103. See, e.g., Root, supra note 16, at 1578-89. 
104. Allen, supra note 9, at 180. 
105. See, e.g., Kangarlou v. Progressive Title Co., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 754 756 (Ct 
App. 2005). 
mo°,6A S<^: eg'' Mack~Cali Realty, L.P. v. Everfoam Insulation Sys., Inc., 12 N.Y.S.3d 106, 
109 (^PPaDiv- 2015); WingHaven Residential Owners Ass'n v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d 383, 385 
a on\^?P' ): SheIcon Constr. Group, LLC v. Raymond, 351 P.3d 895, 900 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
4459018 W|lters Dev- Co Inc. v. Twp. of Barnegat, No. L-1746-09, 2013 WL 
tlThe a r ./ Per,'Pt'.AP"-Dlv' Aug 22' 2013) <no«ng 'he "general policy disfavor-
818 82^Ind r,f.,1*" V' fridge Homeowners Ass'n, 825 N.E.2d 
"make the nr r PP' f. <ldenMymg "P°bcy" of enforcing fee-shifting provisions to make the prevailing party to a contract whole."). 
1998V TIC'Tnfr j0hl^T°n Entef 'f Jacksonville v. FPL Grp., 162 F.3d 1290, 1329 (11th Cir. 
1998), IIG Ins. Co^v. Newmont Mining Corp., 413 F. Supp. 2d 273, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
1U5L bee, e.g., Creyts Complex, Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 98 F.3d 321 325 (7th Cir 1996 V 
Ren Cucchi Constr., Inc. v. O'Keefe, 973 S.W.2d 520. 528 (Mo. Ct. App 1998) 
ADD Ct 200mf«X N̂ +/1US Pain Ctr"' V" No{fsinSer, 726 N.E.2d 687, 694 (111. 
App. Ct. 2000) ( A party can be considered to be a 'prevailing party' for the purposes of a fee-
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those cases, there are few clear answers as to who should be deemed 
the prevailing party. There are, however, some general principles that 
can be drawn from the case law. This section looks at each of those 
principles in turn. 
A. A Party's Victory Need Not Be Complete to Be 
the Prevailing Party 
Courts nationwide appear to agree that a party need not un­
equivocally win all issues in a case in order to be the prevailing party 
for fee shifting purposes, although they differ somewhat in how they 
express this. Some have cited with approval Black's Law Dictionary, 
which defines a "prevailing party" as "[a] party in whose favor a judg­
ment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded."111 In 
a slightly different formulation, some courts have considered a prevail-
ing party to be a party "prevailing on the main issue in dispute, even 
though not necessarily to the extent of its original contention."112 
Other courts have cast an even broader net, deeming any party who 
wins on any significant issue in the litigation . . . achieving] some of 
the benefit . . . sought" to be a prevailing party.113 Still others have 
borrowed the definition of "prevailing party" from the statutory fee 
shifting context for contractual fee shifting.114 These courts found that 
a party prevails "when actual relief on the merits materially alters the 
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the [second 
party's] behavior in any way that directly benefits the [first party]."115 
shifting provision when it is successful on any significant issue in the action and achieves 
some benefit in bringing suit, when it receives a judgment in its favor, or when it achieves 
an affirmative recovery."). 
111. Prevailing Party, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Eagle Jets, LLC v. At­
lanta Jet, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 386, 402 (Ct. App. 2013); Curo Enter., v. Dunes Residential 
Servs., Inc., 342 P.3d 948, 956 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015); Matthes v. Wynkoop, 435 S.W.3d 100, 
111 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014); EAC Props., L.L.C. v. Brightwell, No. 13AP-773, 2014 WL 
2048191, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 2014). 
112. Ken Cucchi Constr., Inc., 973 S.W.2d at 528; see also SEECO, Inc. v. K.T. Rock, 
LLC, 416 S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex. App. 2013); Meredith v. Weller, No! 
E2010-02573-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 219082 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012); Rod & Rifle 
Inn v. Giltrap, 902 P.3d 38, 40-41 (Mont. 1995). 
113. Alhalabi v. Mo. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
Other cases have used slightly different language that is essentially the same in substance. 
See Royal Investment Grp., LLC v. Wang, 961 A.2d 665, 695 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); R.J. 
Mgmt. Co. v. SRLP Dev. Corp., 806 N.E.2d 1074, 1086 (111. App. Ct. 2004); Black v. Bedford 
at Lake Catherine Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 801 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
114. See, e.g., Intercontinental Grp. P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650 
(Tex. 2009). 
115. Magnetic Resonance Plus v. Imaging Sys. Int'l, 543 S.E.2d 32, 36 (Ga. 2001); see 
also Intercontinental Grp. P'ship, 295 S.W.3d at 652. 
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Though the words used in each definition vary, the basic principle re­
mains the same: a party may "prevail," and obtain fee shifting, without 
an unequivocal victory. 
Indeed, a variety of courts have concluded that a party may be 
considered the prevailing party under a contractual fee shifting clause 
even if it did not recover damages in the main action.116 Although 
other courts have reached the opposite conclusion,117 in at least some 
cases their reasoning was expressly tied to the party's failure to obtain 
not just damages, but also any other kind of affirmative relief, such as 
an injunction, consent decree, or settlement.118 And the procurement of 
equitable relief, even in the absence of damages, has regularly been 
recognized as sufficient to support prevailing party fee shifting.119 In 
fact, in some cases, courts have found that a party "prevailed" in litiga­
tion even in the absence of a judgment, with for instance a favorable 
settlement establishing the basis for fee shifting.120 
B. It Is Possible for Both Parties or Neither Party to Be 
the Prevailing Party 
As the breadth of these definitions of "prevailing" would seem to 
suggest, it is not unheard of for both parties to a litigation to be 
deemed prevailing parties. For example, in Johnson Enterprises of 
116. See, e.g.. Greater Hous. Radiation Oncology, P.A. v. Sadler Clinic Ass'n, P.A., 384 
S.W.3d 875, 895-96 ( Tex. App. 2012); Khodam v. Escondido Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 87 
So.3d 65, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz, 726 S.E.2d 556, 
557-58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Regency Realty Inv'rs, LLC v. Cleary Fire Prot., Inc., 260 P.3d 1, 
6 (Colo. App. 2009). 
117. Sunset Presbyterian Church v. Andersen Constr. Co., 341 P.3d 192, 201 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2014); Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilde, 385 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex. App. 2012); 
Baldoria v. Security Realty Inv., Inc., 581 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991). 
118. See, e.g., Intercontinental Grp. P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S W 3d 650 
655 (Tex. 2009Y, Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 385 S.W.3d at 739. In Intercontinental, the 
court observed that the plaintiff had obtained some favorable rulings but no "actual relief on 
the mente that would materially alter [its] relationship with" the defendant. Intercontinen­
talGrp. F'ship 295 SW.3d at 656-57. Such "purely technical or de minimis success" could 
not make the plaintiff a prevailing party in any non-Pyrrhic sense." Id. 
119. JobConnection Servs. Inc. v. Munoz, No. 2:13-3901, 2015 WL 3440842 at *4 
WL286M75at'»2S(T); CrMk ^ No 03 09-00^22 CV 20.0 
a . d at 8 (Tex. App. July 22, 2010); Homeland Training Ctr., LLC v. Summit Point 
Auto Research Ctr 594 F.3d 285, 301 n.9 (4th Cir. 2010); Novus Franchising Inc v Ok-
setulahl , Noa. No 07-1964 & 07-1965, 2008 WL 835681, at <2 (D. Minn. March 27, 2008). 
. uro Lnter., LLC v. Dunes Residential Servs., Inc. 342 P 3d 948 9^7 <Knn rt 
App HndH°nIliVer Int''Inc''33 NE3d 12^5'1265 ,Mass: 
(D Kan Feb 2 2012V Sir V" N° 10"4°38-KHV, 2012 WL 359753. at *1 
WL 58676 at LM' C°rp" N°' *00CV2179, 2011 
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Jacksonville v. FPL Group, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that both 
parties prevailed because both had won major issues in the suit.121 
e court considered the possibility that only a party that brought a 
c aim could prevail on it, but ultimately determined that the parties to 
a contract would not wish to make the availability of fee shifting hinge 
on which party managed to make it to the courthouse first.122 Simi­
larly, the Seventh Circuit in Creyts Complex, Inc. v. Marriot 
Corporation concluded that both a plaintiff and a defendant with a 
counterclaim could be considered the prevailing party on their oppo­
nent s claim, reasoning that "the contract's fees and costs provision 
does not limit itself only to the first action brought in a dispute."123 The 
couit then awarded both parties fee shifting, ordering each of them to 
pay their opponent's defensive costs.124 Other courts have followed the 
same approach.121 At the same time, however, there are courts that 
have agreed that both parties prevailed where each won a major issue 
in the case, but have come to the opposite conclusion as to the appro­
priate result, declining to award fee shifting to either party.126 This 
outcome seems to stem from a sense that where both parties prevail, in 
essence neither party does, the litigation is "a draw."12? Of course, it 
may be driven by simple pragmatism as well. 
In a similar vein, a number of courts have concluded that there 
was no prevailing party, and that neither party should be awarded fee 
shifting, when both parties won significant issues in the litigation.128 
121. Johnson Enterprises of Jacksonville v. FPL Group, 162 F.3d 1290, 1330 (11th Cir 
1998). 
122. Id. 
123. Creyts Complex, Inc. v. Marriot Corporation, 98 F.3d 321, 325 (7th Cir 1996) 
124. Id. 
125. Randall May Int'l, Inc. v DEG Music Prod., Inc., No. SA CV 05-00894 TJH, 2013 
WL 1344915, at *1 (C.D. Cal. April 2, 2013); Herlihy v. Wakefield of Mass., Inc., No. 09-P-
441, 2010 WL 1727386, at *7 (Mass. App. Ct. April 30, 2010); American Multi-Cinema, Inc. 
v. Southroads, LLC, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1214-15 (D. Kan. 2000); Chang v. Louis & Alex­
ander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110, 1115 (D.C. 1994). 
126. Med+Plus Neck & Back Pain Center, S.C. v. Nossfinger, 726 N.E.2d 687, 694 (111. 
App. Ct. 2000); Yonak v. Hawker Well Works, Inc., No. A14-1221, 2015 WL 1514166, at *6 
(Minn. Ct. App. April 6, 2015); Mulder v. Cabinet Distrib., Inc., No. 45667-2-II, 2015 WL 
563973, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2015); Winters v. Winters, 87 P.3d 1005, 1015 (Mont. 
2004); Danner v. Pusich, No. 86-1481-FR, 1989 WL 19180, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 1989). 
127. See, e.g., PNA Bank v. Open Solutions, Inc, No. 08 C 4153, 2009 WL 186183 at *6 
(N.D. 111. Jan. 20, 2009). 
128. U.S. Foodservice, Inc. v. Shamrock Foods Co., Inc., 246 F. App'x 570, 578 (10th Cir. 
2007); Smith v. Simas, 324 P.3d 667, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 2014); Walnut Retail Ctr. General 
Partner, LC v. LBL, Ltd., No. 04-13-00878-CV, 2014 WL 5463898, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 29, 
2014); Maradiaga v. Intermodal Bridge Transp., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1028-L, 2013 WL 
4761108, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2013); TIG Ins. Co. v. Newmont Mining Corp 413 F 
Supp. 3d 273, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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This conclusion seems to be premised at least in part on the idea that 
contractual fee shifting provisions are to be strictly construed because 
they are in derogation of the American Rule,129 and in part on equita­
ble concerns.130 As the Eighth Circuit stated in Walton General 
Contractors v. Chicago Forming, Inc., "the parties intended the attor­
neys' fees provision. . . to provide an additional remedy for a 
nonbreaching party," not to create a windfall for a breaching party 
whose actions simply happened to have caused less damage than its 
opponent's.131 And it would perhaps be inequitable to force a party that 
not only participated in an action in good faith but actually prevailed 
on some of its contentions to bear the entirety of its adversary's fees.132 
Indeed, courts have expressed concern that attorneys' fees may "be­
come the tail that wags the dog in litigation" when they exceed the 
amount of actual damages awarded in the case.133 Thus, faced with 
two parties that have both enjoyed limited success in an action, courts 
have not hesitated to declare that neither prevailed, and to order each 
party to bear its own costs. 
C. The "Net Judgment" Rule is Commonly Applied, But Often Only 
as a Starting Point, and Other Factors 
Have Also Found Favor 
At the same time, however, some jurisdictions have remained 
adamant that there can only be one prevailing party for fee shifting 
purposes.134 As a Florida appeals court has explained it: 
1999). 
129. See Brown & Kerr, Inc. v. Am. Stores Props., Inc., 715 N.E.2d 804, 813 (III. App. Ct. 
130. See McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 534 (Wy. 2000) 
131. I l l  F.3d 1376. 1384 (8th Cir 1<W7V CiJ t f  f t  I  f\ 1 'I A II: „X —. T > • #» • « 
Corp., 678 So.2d 822, 822-23 (Fla. u£ Ct'. App. 19*S, 
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n ess in the same lawsuit there are separate and distinct claims 
w ich would support independent actions, there can only be one 
prevailing party. When alternative theories of liability are litigated, 
only one party can prevail. Either appellant or appellees breached 
e contract The breach by one party to a contract releases the 
other party from performing any future contractual obligations. Ei­
ther appellant or appellee is entitled to attorney fees under the 
contract. If there could not be two breaches, there could not be two 
prevailing parties.135 
Other courts have argued that to find that both parties or neither party 
prevailed because both parties won claims is to take too narrow a view 
of prevailing, noting that: 
It transpires frequently that in the verdict each party wins on some 
of the issues and as to such issues he prevails, but the party in 
whose favor the verdict compels a judgment is the prevailing party. 
Each side may score, but the one with the most points at the end of 
the contest is the winner, and ... is entitled to recover his costs 
136 
These courts place the focus on which party ultimately won the case 
viewed in its entirety and declare that party to have prevailed.137 
This determination to look at the overall results of a case in 
determining prevailing party status is perhaps best embodied in the 
so-called net judgment rule," which compares the amounts recovered 
by plaintiff and defendant and awards fees to the party with the 
greater recovery.138 Courts discussing the rule have viewed it as "a de­
vice to do equity and prevent undue focus on the outcome of a single 
claim at the expense of the larger picture.139 Indeed, outside of the con­
tractual context, the net judgment rule seems to have developed as a 
way of preventing defendants from avoiding fee shifting where the 
plaintiffs recovered damages, but not on the specific claim as to which 
135. Reinhart v. Miller, 548 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
136. Ozias v. Haley, 125 S.W. 556, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910); see also Quapaw Co v 
Varnell, 566 P.2d 164, 167 (Okla. Civ. App. 1977). 
137. See, e.g., Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., Nos. 94-6218 & 94-6305 
1996 WL 87055, at *10 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1996); Marcum v. Wengert, 40 S.W.3d 230, 236 
(Ark. 2001); Bardon Trimount, Inc. v. Guyott, 732 N.E.2d 916, 927 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
138. Mulder v. Cabinet Distrib., Inc., No. 45667-2-II, 2015 WL 563973, *3 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Feb. 10, 2015); Leon F. Cohn, M.D., P.A. v. Visual Health & Surgical Ctr., 125 So.3d 
860, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); White River Village, LLP v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Md., Nos. 08-cv-00248-REB-MEH & 08-cv-00359-REB-MEH, 2011 WL 4501917, at *8 
(D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2011); Lewistown Miller Constr. Co. v. Martin, 271 P 3d 48 56 (Mont 
2011). 
139. Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360, 1363 (Fla. 1996); see also Szoboszlay v. 
Glessner, 664 P.2d 1327, 1334 (Kan. 1983). The Prosperi court was dealing with prevailing 
party status under a mechanic's lien statute, but the net judgment rule operates the same 
way in that context as in contractual fee shifting cases. Id. at 1363. 
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fee shifting is explicitly authorized.140 The rule is generally simple to 
apply,141 and courts have recognized it as at least "a good starting 
point" or a "significant" factor to determine which party really accom­
plished more through the litigation.142 But it has also been criticized 
as "simplistic" and "mechanical," the suggestion being that it fails to 
take into account perspectives on the results of the litigation beyond 
the purely mathematical.143 For example, courts have noted that sim­
ply looking at the net judgment rule does not allow courts to take into 
account the relative importance or significance of the individual claims 
won or lost in the litigation,144 or the relationship between the 
amounts recovered and the amounts that were originally sought.145 
Thus, courts have looked at other ways of determining a prevailing 
party for purposes of a contractual fee-shifting clause. 
Some courts award fees to the party that prevailed on the "main 
issue in the litigation.110 They seem to decide which issue was the 
main one by examining the emphasis each was given in the pleadings, 
the briefing, the evidence presented at trial, and the request for relief 
made of the finder of fact.147 As one court put it: 
Not all of the claims were equal in terms of emphasis at trial or in 
terms of the relief sought. Some were essentially abandoned, and 
M14<^ ±LChT v- Chak Yam Chau' No- 14-14654, 2015 WL 7258668, at *6 (11th Cir 
Nov 17, 2015). This case dealt with Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices statute. 
141. See also Zavatchen v. RHF Holdings, Inc., 907 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
(llth Cife2000VSHP9 M1§ tMkrtg" lnCT^DFia' ExPress Shipping Co., 217 F.3d 1247, 1251 
69891 ̂  JT 'M n p^n' oC on Constr. Corp., No. 11-CV-02600-JCS, 2014 WL 
2010) ; °1Sen V' Lund' 246 R3d 521' 523 (Utah Ct- APP-
p—i 'T' vi K/snAssT' Fla" 665 S°' 2d of 144. See Carlson Distnb. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co L C 95 P 3d 1171 i iki ittui, 
20i?WLiyM3M7V9, ^ Rahmani v' Park- No' CVA09-008, 
Three cSSSStt ™ 8°8' 814 <8* «r. 
2011,N° N°' ^O-dSS^OA-RS^OU ^"pp. 
App. 2013);eMohacanVOi7rGLTdLLr^v's^'rpi^E T" SW'3d ®58' 671 <TeX' 
324 (Tex. App. 2011). ' ' bcorpion Exploration & Prod., Inc., 337 S.W.3d 310, 
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others were defeated in motions practice and were not submitted to 
the jury or raised in this appeal. The clear focus at trial, as it has 
been in the appeal, was on Bhatia's claims for breach of contract 
and breach of fiduciary duty. These intermingled claims were the 
bases tor the vast majority of the testimony and were the primary 
bases tor Bhatia's claim that he was entitled to $7.29 million in ac­
tual damages.148 
The main issue will often be a legal issue, such as whether there was a 
breach of contract, but a party need not win that issue on the same 
exact legal theory it originally raised in order to prevail.149 And "is­
sues" are to be viewed as distinct from "remedies;" whether an 
agreement is enforceable is an issue—and potentially the main issue— 
whereas whether an injunction should issue is merely a question of 
remedies.150 Of course, in some cases, the way the parties frame the 
case will make the "main issue" whether one party owes the other 
money, in which case the application of the main issue test becomes 
basically identical to that of the net judgment rule.151 
The main issue test differs from the net judgment rule in the 
important respect that defeating an opponent's claim can be given as 
much or more weight as obtaining a monetary recovery on a claim of 
one's own. As the Supreme Court of Alaska put it, a litigant "who suc­
cessfully defeats a claim of great potential liability may be the 
prevailing party even if the other side receives an affirmative recov­
ery."152 This is so because, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money 
judgment is for a plaintiff.... while a plaintiff with a large money 
148. Bhatia, 396 S.W.3d at 671. The court went on to determine that the appellees were 
the prevailing party because "[tjhe purpose of Bhatia's lawsuit was to recover damages" and 
"he wholly failed to do so," while "(t|he purpose of appellees' defense to these main issues 
was to avoid paying any damages" and "[t]hey were successful and received a take-nothing 
judgment in their favor." Id. 
149. See Town & Country Pship v. Frontier Leasing Corp., No. 1-07-00555-CV 2009 
WL 723991, at *2-3 (Tex. App. March 19, 2009). 
150. See Paradise v. Midwest Asphalt Coatings, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Mo Ct ADD 
2010). ' 
151. See Pinehurst/Fairmout Partners, L.P. v. Concrete Prods., Inc., No. 05-00-01223-
CV, 2001 WL 832351, at *3 (Tex. App. July 25, 2001). In that case, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant for breach of contract, alleging a failure to perform under the lease agreement by 
not providing 8,700 square feet of space, resulting in an overpayment of rent. Id. The 
plaintiff did not seek more space from the defendant or recission of the contract; it sought 
only to recover overpaid rent. Id. Thus, the court concluded that "the main issue in the case 
is whether one party owed the other money" and that accordingly "it was necessary for |the 
plaintiff] to recover money damages in order to prevail on the main issue in the case." Id. 
152. See Alaska Constr. & Eng"g, Inc. v. Balzer Pacific Equip. Co., 130 P.3d 932, 936 
(Alaska 2006); see also DocMagic, Inc. v. Mortg. P'ship of Am., LLC No. 4:09CV1779MLM 
2012 WL 263091, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 30, 2012). 
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judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply walks 
out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the value 
of a successful defense.151 
Thus, if a defendant defeats the plaintiffs main claim in an action, that 
defendant should be considered the prevailing party under this test, 
even if the plaintiff has obtained damages on less important ancillary 
claims.154 Indeed, a court applying this test may even go beyond sim­
ply looking at whether a plaintiff recovered on a claim to comparing 
the amount recovered against the amount initially sought; if a plaintiff 
obtained far less than desired, the defendant in a sense prevailed in 
defeating the majority of that claim.155 
Other courts have given the comparative analysis of damages 
sought and received even greater weight in their prevailing party anal­
yses.156 For example, the Utah Court of Appeals recently opined that in 
determining prevailing party status: 
The focus should be on which party obtained a comparative victory, 
considering what a total victory would have meant for each party 
and what a true draw would look like. For example, where a plain­
tiff sued for $30,000 and the defendant claimed to owe nothing, a 
draw would have been a decision dividing the $30,000 equally, that 
is, a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $15,000. Simi­
larly. . . defendants ordered to pay $7,339.44 on a $600,000 claim — 
slightly over 1% — were held to be the prevailing parties. Where 
the defendant advances a counterclaim, the calculus changes. For 
example. . . |in an earlier easel the plaintiff was claiming roughly 
$13,000, the defendants were claiming roughly $25,000, and the de­
fendants reaped a net recovery of $527. The trial court properly 
declared a "draw" and awarded no attorney fees.157 
The idea is to look at the parties' objectives at the outset of the litiga­
tion, as set forth in the pleadings, and then assess the level of success 
(Idaho 2005)lteen M,le Ranch' LLC V' Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 133 
at1f141 ^ MaSka C°n8tr- & En8'8> 130 P.3d at 936; see also DocMagic, 2012 WL 263091, 
and —jj'y defended five of X seTen 
Sus fo V. W?PS' J A ty796Fp°rtsSm,t5H4,4,07? W'3d 346> 350 ,Ark' Ct' A»P- 2™>: 
Park, 2011 olTl SXincv V'TrZ, r 7' °al' 20n»' v. 
a S S p e d a " *  I E « S 2 3 6 2 2 !  
157. Olsen v. Lund, 246 P.3d 521, 523 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). 
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each party attained in pursuing those objectives.158 Whichever party 
accomplished more of its goals—whether in establishing or avoiding 
lability—must be considered to have prevailed in the overall 
litigation.159 
In addition to the number and importance of issues on which 
each party prevailed and the relationship between the parties' goals 
and the outcome, courts have identified other factors to consider in de­
termining the prevailing party. For example, some courts have 
considered which party precipitated the litigation and how reasonable 
the parties respective settlement positions were.160 The rationale for 
the first factor appears to be that awarding fees may be inequitable if 
the party receiving them somehow acted improperly or unreasonably 
in bringing about the litigation.161 The second factor, meanwhile, 
seems to penalize parties for wasting judicial resources on a trial that 
does not provide a substantially better result than settlement would 
have.162 Other courts have considered the merits of the unsuccessful 
party s claims or defenses, the novelty of the issues, whether fee shift­
ing would cause extreme hardship, and whether it would potentially 
discourage other parties from litigating legitimate contract issues for 
fear of similarly incurring fees.163 Again, the concern animating the 
consideration of these factors appears to be equitable; courts are loath 
to deter parties from making viable legal arguments for fear of a devas­
tating fee-shifting award.164 
158. Susilo, 796 F. Supp. at 1182. 
159. Id. 
160. Interstate Power Sys. v. Drake Water Tech., Inc., 426 F. App'x 678, 681 (10th Cir. 
2011); Doig v. Cascaddan, 935 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1997). 
161. Montoya v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 793 P.2d 258, 260 (N.M. 1990) (quoting McClain 
Co. v. Page & Wirtz, 694 P.2d 1349, 1350 (N.M. 1985)) ("The court in its discretion could 
conclude that allowing attorney's fees when both parties had acted improperly would be 
inequitable and unreasonable."). 
162. SCI Cal. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Five Bridges Found., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693 717 (Ct 
App. 2012). 
163. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Crown Corr, Inc., No. CV 11-0965-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 
2798653, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012); Assoc. Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 
(Ariz. 1985). These factors arise in the context of determining whether the prevailing party 
is entitled to an award of fees (as opposed to determining which party is the prevailing party 
in the first place), but in practical effect being named a prevailing party but denied fees is 
equivalent to being denied prevailing party status. 
164. See Mozingo v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 667 (Alaska 2005) ("|W|e must 
be careful about allowing fee-shifting provisions to undercut provisions meant to encourage 
plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims."); Brand v. Dep't of Labor & Indus, of State of Wash., 
989 P.2d 1111, 1115 (Wash. 1999) (fee shifting intended to "punish frivolous litigation and 
encourage meritorious litigation"). 
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D. Courts May Reduce the Amount of Fees Awarded to a Prevailing 
Party Based on Reasonableness or Lack of Success 
Simply being named the prevailing party under a contract does 
not necessarily mean that a party will be awarded the entirety of its 
attorneys' fees related to the lawsuit. Some contractual fee shifting 
clauses expressly limit the prevailing party to a sum that is "reasona­
ble."165 Even if the clause does not so provide, however, some state 
statutes require that fee awards in contract cases be reasonable.166 
And some states read a reasonableness requirement into fee shifting 
clauses under their common law.167 In fixing reasonable attorneys' fees 
in contract cases, courts often multiply the number of hours reasonably 
expended by the lawyer's reasonable hourly rate.166 They may gauge 
what is reasonable in light of a number of factors, including the time 
and labor required in the case; the likelihood that the case has pre­
vented the lawyer from taking other employment; the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved; the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly; the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services; the amount of money involved and the results 
obtained; the time limitations imposed by the client; the nature and 
length of the relationship between lawyer and client; the experience, 
reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
and whether the fee was fixed or contingent.169 
IKIOHC ?a^011 V' Montgomery Cty- Comm'n on Aging, No. 324140, 2016 WL 
q APP" Jan" 12' 2016)5 P°mte W" Ctr" LLC v" It>s Alive, Inc., 476 
mi A n A PP' 5 Kel,y v- °rnco> No- 2-14-1042, 2015 WL 5011637, at *1 
(111. App. Ct. Aug 24, 2015). 
166., f*' e*' °«i R-;v; Stat- § 20082 (2010) ("Except as provided in this section, a court 
if (a) ThP^mnnnrf fKa y ff l° PrevaiIinS Party 06 any claim based on contract 
, (a) 1 l ?° *t®fthe PnnciPal together with interest due on the contract at the time the 
claim is filed is $ 0,000 or less; and (b) The contract does not contain a clause that autho-
ongS contractrGS 'theT^ °f feef>5 Cai " ClV11' CODE § 1717 (1987) ("In any action 
on a contract . the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party speci-
^ °A n0\Sha11 be 6ntit,ed to reasonable attorney's fees in addltmn to other 
breach ^ntraT T § ^22"3°8 ^ 1989> <"In -/action to r^ver .Tor 
matter of the ^action"'h™ Pr°Vlded by 'aW °r the contract which is the object 
assesse/b^t/ court an/collected 10 * 
167. See, e.g., Martin v. Sheehan, No. 2438, 2015 WL 7421338 m c A 
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Courts have also reduced awards under contractual fee shifting 
provisions o re ect the prevailing party's lack of complete success in 
e 1 iga ion. or example, courts have required that a prevailing 
party segregate its fees by claim, so that fees can be shifted only as to 
those claims on which the party succeeded and/or as to which fee shift­
ing is authorized by the contract.170 Segregation has also been required 
as to fees related to claims directed against third parties not subject to 
a fee shifting agreement.171 Of course, it may happen that the legal 
services related to claims as to which fee shifting is permissible and 
not permissible are so intertwined that they cannot be segregated, in 
which case recovery of the total amount may be allowed.17* This gener­
ally occurs when both claims involve the same nucleus of facts, such 
that preparation of one claim is coextensive with preparation of the 
other.17 ' In other cases, courts have used a prevailing party's limited 
success as a basis for determining that the contractual fee award must 
be reduced to be reasonable.114 Though perhaps less precise than seg­
regation, this approach allows courts to avoid overcompensating an 
only marginally successful party simply because determining which 
fees were related to which count proves challenging.175 
262 'Conn. App. Ct. 2015); Knesek v. Cameron Hubbs Constr., Inc., No. CV-12-942, 2013 
WL 2457287, at 4 (Ark. Ct. App. June 5, 2013); Blockbuster, Inc. v. C-Span Entm't, Inc., 
276 S.W.3d 482, 491 n.8 (Tex. App. 2008); Elchlepp v. Hatfield, 294 S.W.3d 146, 155-56 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); see, e.g., Trodden, Inc. v. J & E Auto Enters., No. 1-10-3733 2014 WL 
1117028, at *8 (111. App. Ct. Mar. 19, 2014). 
170. See e.g., Moba v. Total Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00138-MJP, 2014 WL 
4057156, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2014); Austin v. Metro. Dev. Enter., No. 1-12-0562, 
2013 WL 6869679, at *13 (111. App. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013); Arlington Home, Inc. v. Peak Envtl 
Consultants, Inc., 361 S.W.3d 773, 783-84 (Tex. App. 2012); Daynight, LLC v. Mobilighf 
Inc., 248 P.3d 1010, 1013 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); United States ex rel. Belt Con Constr. v. 
Metric Constr. Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1045 (D. N.M. 2007). 
171. See e.g., Peak Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Land & Sea Eng"g, LLC, No. H-10-1568 2012 
WL 3234203, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2012); Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 
523 (Ct. App. 1999). 
172. See Arlington Home, 361 S.W.3d at 783-84; Gruber v. Deuschle, 261 F. Supp. 2d 
682, 697 (N.D. Tex. 2003). The court in Arlington Home determined that segregation was 
required because "it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and 
unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated." 361 
S.W.3d at 784. 
173. Daynight, 248 P.3d at 1013; Animal Blood Bank, Inc. v. Hale, No. 2:10-cv-02080 
KJM KJN, 2012 WL 5868004, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012). 
174. See e.g., DiMarzio v. Crazy Mountain Constr., Inc., 243 P.3d 718, 724 (Mont. 2010); 
Ulloa v. QSP, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 43, 49-50 (Va. 2006); Beach Street Bikes, Inc. v. Bourgett's 
Bike Works, Inc., 900 So.2d 697, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
175. See e.g., Phi Kappa Tau Housing Corp. v. Wengert, 86 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Ark. 2002) 
(finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reduced an award of attorney's fees 
based on reasonableness where the work on winning and losing claims were "hopelessly 
intertwined" and "virtually impossible" to segregate). 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Careful Drafting 
Parties and their attorneys would be well advised to carefully 
delineate when fee shifting should be permitted at the time they exe­
cute their contract rather than waiting for litigation to ensue. After 
all, courts view their primary objective in construing a contract to be 
effectuating the intent of the parties.176 In fee shifting cases, courts 
frequently look fruitlessly in the parties' contract for guidance as to 
when fee shifting should be permitted before having to turn to other 
sources, like a law dictionary or case law, to determine whether to shift 
fees and in what amount.177 Parties can and should provide their views 
on the subject. By thinking about what sorts of disputes may arise 
between them and to what extent they wish to create the potential to 
recover fees (or the risk of having fees recovered, depending on their 
outlook), the parties can hope to better control the range of potential 
outcomes should litigation arise. 
For starters, the parties can set a broad or narrow range of ac­
tions covered by the clause, from, for instance, "any action to 
enforce"178 or "interpret"179 the agreement on the narrow end to "any 
action relating to"189 or "arising out of'181 the agreement (or just any 
litigation at all) on the broad end. The contractual language may well 
determine whether fee-shifting is allowed for all claims in the action or 
just a subset; [i]f a contractual attorney fee provision is phrased 
broadly enough ... it may support an award of attorney fees to the 
SSRC3® asRSS5®"» -"-••• •""" 
A 
See,f'g" Sto11 GrouP LLC v- Cottrill, No. 320763, 2015 WL 2437127 at *5 (Mich Pt 
mXTOSiv- cr r1 LendmE' llc- n°- 2oi4 
feei"7s8hiftisngiin t™?casi 
2015)'. V' Ck Veterinaiy H°=P. Inc., 359 P.3d 884, 891 (Wash Ct. App. 
179. Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz, 751 S.E.2d 45, 46 (Ga. 2013) 
Super. Mktg" lDC" N°' CV 90 °113484- W WL 33394, at -1 (Conn. 
WL2677279, LLC" No' 1 CA"CV 09-0436. 2010 
2017 PREVAILING PARTY FEE SHIFTING 211 
prevailing party in an action alleging both contract and tort claims."182 
As set forth previously,183 courts do sometimes rely on the contractual 
language to require a prevailing party to segregate its fees by claim 
into those that are recoverable and those that are not. 
The Parties may also wish to define the term "prevail." In doing 
so they could select one of the specific approaches discussed above, like 
e ermining w ch party has the net judgment or who came closest to 
the optimal outcome, or even choose a more generic definition such as 
the party that "substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought."184 
Wlsh to consider specifying whether a party must "pre­
vail by obtaining a judgment, or whether it may do so "by compromise, 
settlement. . . or the abandonment of the other Party . .. of its claim or 
defense. 18 • Or the parties could come up with their own unique 
method of determining prevailing party status. For example, they 
could avoid general terms like "prevailing party" or "successful party" 
in favor of a detailed explanation of when fees should be shifted and 
when they should not. Generally, so long as the parties' contract is not 
unconscionable and does not violate public policy, it will be enforced.186 
1 he specific language to be included will obviously depend on the objec­
tives of the contracting parties but reaching consensus at the time the 
contract is drafted will make sure those objectives are expressed and, 
hopefully, will be implemented by a court rather than superseded by 
general principles of law. 
B. Careful Construction 
In determining whether to award fee shifting under a contract, 
courts should, as with any contractual issue, first work to discern the 
intent of the contracting parties.187 If the plain meaning of the contract 
as to the fees issue is clear and unambiguous, a court need not consult 
any other sources.188 Of course, as set forth above, some states have 
182. Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1998). The court found that a fee-shift­
ing clause applying to all actions "arising out of the execution of thlel agreement or the sale" 
was broad enough to include tort as well as contract claims. Id. 
183. See discussion supra Section II.D. 
184. Post Apple, LLC v. Acrew Mgmt. LLC, Nos. A142859 & A143832, 2015 WL 
6560471, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015). 
185. 16th Group, LLC v. Lynch Mech. Constr., LLC, 334 P.3d 988, 989 (Or. Ct. App 
2014). 
186. LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, 331 P.3d 1147, 1170 (Wash. 2014) 
(Madsen, J., dissenting); Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Stewart Venture, LLC 
300 P.3d 124, 128-29 (Nev. 2013). 
187. Castleberry v. Phelan, 101 P.3d 460, 463 (Wy. 2004). 
188. Id. 
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statutes that apply to contractual fee shifting.189 These statutes ap­
pear to have been primarily designed to ensure that both parties have 
an equal opportunity to obtain fee shifting should they prevail, without 
having to alter the parties' private agreements.190 Accordingly, these 
statutes should not be used to prevent courts from effectuating the par­
ties' intent as to fee shifting, unless that intent was "oppressive" and 
"one-sided."191 If the parties intended to mutually broaden or narrow 
the definition of what it means to prevail, then courts should permit 
them to do so. 
The courts should also not attempt to graft fee shifting stan­
dards developed in the context of civil rights and other statutory 
lawsuits onto private contractual disputes. Those standards were de­
veloped with different goals in mind, namely to "ensure equal access to 
the justice system" and "encourage compliance with and enforcement 
of' statutes that vindicate the public interest.192 Indeed, statutory fee 
shifting has often been enacted with the intent to motivate civically-
minded lawsuits by "private attorneys general."198 Contractual fee 
shifting clauses, however, can be drafted with an eye towards discour­
aging litigation and encouraging settlement.194 Frequently, 
contractual fee-shifting clauses concern disputes between two private 
parties where there is no public interest at stake.198 Thus, broadly con­
struing what it means for a plaintiff to prevail—such as by including 
any material alteration of the relationship between the parties that 
benefits the plaintiff198—may not make sense in the contractual fee 
shifting context. Similarly, some of the factors courts consider in as­
sessing reasonableness in the statutory context seem inapposite to the 
contractual fee shifting context.*" For example, courts assessing stat-
w189' DSee'„eg" CaI" CmL CoDE § 1717(a) (1987); Or. Rev Stat 8 20 096(1) <9009.-Wash. Rev. Code § 4.84.330 (effective July 22, 2011) *>.096(1) (2009), 
dissenting)" ^ ^ SantiS3S V" Goodin'951 P-2d 399, 416 (Cal. 1998) (Baxter, J. 
191. Santisas, 951 P.2d at 416 (Baxter, J. dissenting) 
193 Sef^r Mktg" V" 812 A 2d 12?°' 1276 <Pa" SuPer" Ct- 2002). 1J4. bee Shub, supra note 8, at 710-11. 
195." sJeMnn' G1^°°d Brokers' Ltd- 848 P.2d 936, 940 (Colo. 1993). 
2010) ("We hold thaTthe lodestar methodTs"^V' Hami,ton' 7 A 3d h 7 <Md. Ct. App. 
awards in private, contractual debt-collecting cTsTus^of The^d'T f°r Cal.cu'atinS fee cases is inappropriate because thev IarU i ( '• . lodestar method in such 
^196 i^ aPP oa in ^ont^^o^true fee^^ifti^ g^tatutes."1).'61^68^ ̂ US^'^Ca^'°n 
sense to interpret "preying" thai' broadly if th '°h ^ h8nd' ^ '"ight make 
in their contract). g adly lf the partles have evidenced an intent to do so 
(failing £ ns^eltS t^' ̂  E'eC" lDC" 33 A3d 828' 831^ ̂ ona. App. Ct. 2012, 
2017 
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was17and ^ow "m CO"s"ieJ.ho'w time consuming and difficult the case 
volved - te these f f ^ f°F the att0r^S in" 
context where ett t factors make perfect sense in the civil rights 
r±e;e^la"^tmg and pr0perly compensating skillful counsel is 
immune to contumacious conduct by the parties, that conduct gener-
a y should not be considered in determining who the prevailing party 
was under a fee shifting clause.^ After all, the parties in their con­
tract agreed that the winning party would obtain fees, not the party 
that litigated most ethically and graciously. On the other hand, such 
inappropriate litigation conduct may be considered in setting the 
amount of fess that a prevailing party may reasonably be granted; to 
the extent it creates unnecessary delay and expense it may justify a 
reduction.-'"2 The parties to a fee shifting agreement would clearly not 
have intended fees resulting from obstreperous conduct to be consid-
Even with the parties' agreement as a guiding star, courts will 
often have considerable leeway to determine which party prevailed in 
the litigation. In doing so, they would be wise to employ a flexible ap­
proach that does not rely solely on mechanical calculations but rather 
198. Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, 297 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2002). 
199. Elec. Wholesalers, 33 A.3d at 832 ("The present case involves a contract dispute 
between two similarly situated businesses, not an action brought pursuant to a statute spe­
cifically enacted to assist private litigants who might otherwise be unable to enforce their 
rights."). 
200. Martin v. Med-Dev Corp., No. 10525-VCP, 2015 WL 6472597, at *19 (Del. Ch. Oct 
27, 2015); Wong v. Luu, 34 N.E.3d 35, 45 (Mass. 2015). 
201. Deane Gardenhome Ass'n. v. Denktas, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816, 818-19 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. 813, 817 (Ct. App. 1987). 
202. EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Tr., 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 907 (Ct. App. 2008). 
ered reasonable. 
C. Holistic, Equitable Analysis 
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considers all the facts and circumstances of the litigation.200 Although 
the net judgment rule can provide a useful starting point, it ignores 
other factors that undoubtedly would have been relevant to the parties 
at the time they signed their contract, including most notably how the 
parties' litigation outcomes compared to their objectives.204 The net 
judgment rule places a premium on recovering a monetary judgment 
and assigns no value to defeating even the highest-dollar-value 
claims.205 This rewards bringing a lawsuit, even where the success in 
doing so is minimal. But fee shifting clauses are often included in con­
tracts with the objective of avoiding litigation.200 Accordingly, 
determining the prevailing party under such a clause should involve a 
consideration of how the plaintiff (or counterplaintifO may have over­
reached and how the defendant (or counterdefendant) may have 
prevailed by avoiding claimed liability. 
In this respect, the approach espoused by Utah courts is attrac­
tive. Among other things, those courts determine the delta between 
the best possible financial outcome for the plaintiff and the best possi­
ble outcome for the defendant and divide that in half.207 If the plaintiff 
recovered less than half of that delta, then the defendant succeeded in 
defeating more liability than it incurred, and could be considered to 
have prevailed.2(18 If the plaintiff recovered more than half, than it ac­
complished more than the defendant in the litigation and is potentially 
entitled to fee shifting.200 This approach credits both offensive and de­
rive success in a lawsuit and thereby seems to comport with the 
likely intentions of the parties to a fee shifting clause. At the same 
time, it encourages efficient litigation and discourages overreaching 
element ,m;ng,milli0ns 0f'dollars in damages (perhaps to stake a 
settlement position) in a case one knows is really worth only 
SSh?,C0U™?' th!s mathematical exercise should not be (and is 
ot, in Utah) a courts sole consideration in determining the prevailing 
v. Jeremiah 
Product „ t c No 2: P_cv_496 20V^Vt20W HOC £a~v. Pre erre 
Neat 7&££r„Vi,»<£££ 'i™'' ̂  Mountain States Broad.'Co'v 
(•«fmthlSPaticŜ  J 4̂ (Utah 2004, 
ignoring a defendant's success in avoiding liahdUv Dn °°r ZT** absUrd results" b-v 
(Mont. 1997) (net judgment "not the only fact that w'aS^J' CaSCaddan- 935 R2d 268' 272 
dants success in avoiding liability, among other things, Conslderat,on ln hght of defen-
20?: 134 Cah Rptr-3d 244'256 «*• 2°»>-
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
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olYfa role-T/fn  ̂̂  imP°rta™e of the various issues may 
fnYhe case the is " ̂ SUCC6eded °n the most hotly-contested issue 
effort, Sen ifmightbe ^ ̂  °f the Partl6S'time and 
numbers sne-o-est D® cons'dered the prevailing party even if the raw 
tT a hohfric e r m Y"' The point is for court to under-
nTenln i! 'iqu able analysis that considers what the parties 
Cutset of theYtY T* the contract> what they hoped for at the 
XT thi J-I.P.4 
That holistic, equitable analysis should not end once the court 
has determined which party prevailed. Courts should not simply hand 
prevailing parties a blank check for their fees, but carefully adjust the 
amount to be awarded based on reasonableness.2" Even if the parties' 
contract does not specifically mention reasonableness, "the notion of 
proportionality is integral to contract fee-shifting to meet the reasona­
ble expectation of the parties."2*2 In other words, no rational party 
vvould ap-ee to shift fees that are unreasonable or bear no relationship 
to the claims on which litigation success was actually achieved. Ac­
cordingly, courts enforcing fee shifting clauses should require careful 
reporting of which portions of the fees relate to what claims and what 
tasks in the litigation.213 They should then award only those fees that 
are reasonable and relate to those claims on which the prevailing party 
actually succeeded.2 ^ And they can also consider whether the prevail­
ing party engaged in overreaching or obstructive conduct that 
unnecessarily increased the cost of the litigation.215 By carefully con­
sidering the equities of the situation and making a fee award that is 
proportionate to the success achieved in the litigation, courts can avoid 
turning a close case on the merits into a bloodbath on the fees issue. 
210. See Bhatia v. Woodlands N. Houston Heart Ctr., PLLC, 396 S.W.3d 658, 670 (Tex. 
App. 2013); Mohican Oil & Gas, LLC v. Scorpion Exploration & Prod., Inc. 337 S W 3d 310 
324 (Tex. App. 2011). ' ' 
211. Acero Precision v. Bonelli, No. 667 EDA 2015, 2015 WL 8805460, at *2 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 15, 2015); Martin, 2015 WL 7421338, at *4; Shoppes of Mount Pleasant, LLC v 
J.M.L., Inc., No. CPU4—14-001415, 2015 WL 3824118, at *1 (Del. Ct. C.P. May 14, 2015). 
212. Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 982 A.2d 420, 430 (N.J. 2009). 
213. See, e.g., Weichert Co. of Md., Inc. v. Faust, 989 A.2d 1227, 1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2010) (prevailing party provided "a good deal of evidence, including her actual bills and 
their corresponding descriptions of services, as well as a lengthy exhibit of itemized fees, 
land! 'breakdowns' of time by category and month, with summaries of events during those 
time frames."). 
214. See Ginn v. Stonecreek Dental Care, Nos. CA2015-01-001 & CA2015-01-002, 
2015 WL 6472584, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2015); Mont. Pub. Emps.' Ass'n v. City of 
Bozeman, 343 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Mont. 2015). 
215. Mont. Pub. Emps.' Ass'n v. City of Bozeman, 343 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Mont. 2015); 
Mont. Pub. Emps.' Ass'n v. City of Bozeman, 343 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Mont. 2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
Although fee shifting has long been viewed as disfavored under 
U.S. law, it is actually not uncommon, given the number of statutes 
and private contracts that authorize it. In the context of statutory fee 
shifting, courts have developed a large body of law that takes a broad 
view of when fees should be shifted to plaintiffs so that they will be 
encouraged to bring lawsuits that are viewed as furthering a public 
interest. Those cases also assess the reasonableness of the fee award 
using a variety of factors aimed at avoiding waste but ensuring that 
qualified counsel will be incentivized to handle these matters. With 
regard to contractual fee shifting, however, the interests involved are 
different and the court decisions less numerous and more contradic­
tory. While courts agree that a party need not achieve complete 
success to prevail and receive contractual fee shifting, they disagree as 
to the degree of success that is required and how success should be 
gauged in a case of multiple claims and counterclaims. Some courts 
have found that both parties (or neither party) can be the prevailing 
party, either granting or denying fees to both parties as a result. And 
courts that have insisted on a single prevailing party have taken a va­
riety of approaches to determining which party it is, from simply 
calculating which party received the net judgment to looking at which 
party won on the main issue to deciding which party achieved more of 
its litigation objectives in pursuing or defeating claims. Meanwhile, 
courts have different tests of what constitutes a reasonable fee award 
in the contractual context, with some courts borrowing the statutory 
reasonableness factors while others focus more on the fee's proportion­
ality to the results obtained in the case. To help remove the 
uncertainty as to when fees will be awarded under a fee shifting 
clause, parties to contracts containing such clauses should carefully 
spell out their own wishes in this regard. Courts should then begin 
their fee shifting analyses by attempting to effectuate the parties' in­
tent, rather than turning to other statutes, case law, or legal 
dictionaries. And where the parties' intent is less than clear, courts 
should engage in a holistic, equitable analysis of what it means to pre-
Z ^ Shifting Clauses are °ften desi^d to 
discourage litigation while statutory fee shifting seeks to encourage it. 
This analysis should include a comparison of the results sought by 
what feefs reas r^ult" °btaiuned and extend to a determination of 
tion that some curr t6' * *** require m0re time and atten" th3t S°me CUrrent aPPr°aches to contractual fee shifting, it will be 
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redure^the^oteMiar^^'H^^016^ t0 th® m6ritS °f most cases 311(1 wiU 
those ̂ nerite almost ** ̂ that C°uld render 
